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A reader contributed a great question recently: “So many more ransomware attacks are getting talked about in the news. Is ransomware growing that quickly, or does it just seem worse than it is?” The answer is “both,” but let’s break things down.

 

According to Security Magazine, ransomware has indeed grown exponentially in the last year, with an 81% increase in attack activity. That’s certainly not good, but may not be telling the whole story. While there’s no doubt that threat actors have increased attacks via Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and more sophisticated automation; some of what we’re seeing is an increase in the number of reported attacks compared to previous years.  

 

Better automation allows threat actors to perform more attack attempts in the same amount of time than they’d be able to perform manually. Scripting and automation have increased the effectiveness of legitimate organizations in many different ways. Processes like allowing a user access to an application which would have previously taken days or a week can now be done in seconds – safely. Stocks trades that would take hours in years past are now done in seconds – also safely, usually. As legitimate businesses have embraced automation to make their organizations better, threat actors have done the same. Now, a new exploit that would allow for a new attack, which would normally take weeks or months to see significant spread throughout the world, can become a major world-wide threat in hours. This, of course, means that more attack attempts leads to more successful attacks and higher numbers of organizations compromised year over year. 

 

RaaS allows established threat actor cartels to re-package and sell attack protocols they no longer use themselves to lower-tier threat actors. This extends the life of the product (the ransomware attack), and allows the cartel to continue to make money from it for much longer periods of time. By having more threat actors use existing tools against still-unpatched systems, more organizations end up compromised.

 

Both of these factors have lead to a marked increase in the total number of ransomware victim organizations over time, and that can’t be dismissed as a statistical blip or anything like that. We’re facing more attacks, more often, across more industries.

 

However, it should be noted that a huge portion of the compromised organizations would not – until recently – have reported the compromise at all. Businesses have many reasons to attempt to hide the fact that they fell victim to a ransomware attack. Loss of customer trust, violation of clauses in contracts, endangering future business – all reasons companies may choose to hide that an attack took place. This isn’t new behavior, as companies would often try to gloss over or bury anything that could impact their bottom line as you would expect – we’re just now talking about impacts caused by digital disasters instead of bad accounting practices, corporate espionage, and other more traditional events. 

 

Generally, if such hidden events and setbacks would cause overall market impact or jeopardize citizens of a country or locality; government agencies create regulation to make it mandatory to report it. This is not something that’s done frequently, and only occurs when the burying of such events would create major fallout in an entire market or a large group of citizens. Typically, new regulations only occur after such a major impact occurs. Over the last several years, the impact of cybersecurity incidents has indeed begun to cause fallout in markets, and has caused impact to massive amounts of citizens through identity theft and other problems. Because of this, governments have begun to pass legislation that makes it mandatory to quickly disclose any cybersecurity incident which might have a “material impact” to markets and/or consumers. You can read more about one such regulation in a previous post here.

 

In the USA, both the Federal Government (specifically the Securities and Exchange Commission) and several State Governments (most notably New York and California) have already passed regulations which compel organizations to report incidents via public filings. The SEC, for example, requires the filing of an amendment to a regular reporting form (8-K) within four days of any incident that has material impact, and the incident must also be part of the annual 10-K filing every public company and certain other companies must file. Since these reports are public, anyone and everyone can view them. Other US states either have regulations that are being/have been amended to cover cybersecurity incidents, or are creating new legislation to make disclosure mandatory for any companies that do business within that state or territory. The European Union and other nations/coalitions are also either strengthening reporting regulations or implementing new regulations specifically around cybersecurity incident reporting.

 

The practical upshot of this is that significantly more incidents are becoming public knowledge that would not have been publicly reported previously. Incidents that would have been “swept under the rug” in previous years are now becoming public knowledge quickly, leading to a marked uptick in the number of known attack victim organizations. While this number is certainly not enough to account for the total increase in attacks, it has most definitely increased the number of reported attacks over the last few years. The combination has lead to massive increases in year-over-year ransomware reports, leading to dramatic news reporting on the problem. As the issue becomes more sensational, everyone hears about it more often and with more volume.

 

So, while it is true that the total number of ransomware attacks has increased sharply due to a combination of the rise Ransomware-as-a-Service and the use of automation in threat actor activities, it is important to also realize some of the sensational numbers are attributable to companies being required to talk about the problem more than in the past. In total, the issue of ransomware and other cybercrime is taking a much bigger share of the public interest – which is a very good thing – but we must look at all of the factors that lead to such numbers to more fully understand what’s going on. 

Once in a while, I get the chance to pull back the curtain on how threat activity works in this column, and a recent question “I got a fake email from Microsoft, but it was the REAL microsoft.com domain – how did they do that?” gives me the opportunity to do so now. Let’s take a look at some of the tricks threat actors use to make you think that spam/threat/phishing email is actually coming from a domain that looks legitimate.

 

Technique 1: Basic Spoofing

Threat actors are able to manipulate emails in many ways, but the most common is to just force your email application to display something other than the real email address they’re sending from. There are several ways to do this, but the most common involves the manipulation of headers. Headers are metadata (data about data) that email systems use to figure out where an email is coming from, where it should go to, who sent it, etc. One of the most common techniques involves using different headers for the display name (which shows up before you hover over the From: address in the message) and the actual email address the mail is coming from (which you can see by hovering over the From: field). This would result in a situation where you get an email from “Microsoft Support ()” and is somewhat easy to spot if you hover over the sender and see what email address it’s really from. 

If you’re wondering why email systems don’t reject messages like that, it’s because this situation is a valid feature-set of how email works. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is the method used by the whole world to send emails, and part of that protocol allows for a display name in addition to an email address. This is how your company’s emails can have the name of the person that sent it to you, or a company can give an email account a friendly name – so there’s a trade-off here. While the feature is legitimate, it can be used for malicious purposes, and you need to look at the actual email address of the sender and not just the display name. 

 

Technique 2: Fake Domains

“OK,” you say, “But I definitely have gotten fake emails that used real email addresses for a company.” While you’re not losing your mind, the emails did not come from the company in question. Threat actors use multiple tricks to ma​ke you be​lieve that the email dom​​ain that message came from is real. For example, in the last sentence, the words “make,” “believe,” and “domain,” aren’t actually those words at all. They have what is known as a “zero-width space” embedded into them. While this space isn’t visible, it’s still there – and my spell-checker flagged each of the words as mis-spelled because they indeed are. Techniques like this allow a threat actor to send an email from “support@m​icrosoft.com” because they registered that email domain with an invisible space between the letters (between the “m” and the “i” in this case). To the naked eye, the domain looks very much real, but from the perspective of an email system, it is not actually the microsoft.com domain, and therefore is not something that would get extra attention from most security tools. 

This same theory can be used in another way. For example, have a look at AMAΖON.COM – notice anything odd there besides it being in all caps? Well, the “Z” in that domain name isn’t a “Z” at all – it’s the capitalized form of the Greek letter Zeta. Utilizing foreign characters and other Unicode symbols is a common way to trick a user into believing that an email is coming from a domain that they know, when in fact it is coming from a domain specifically set up to mislead the user. 

There are two ways to defend against this kind of malicious email activity. The first – and most important – is to follow best practices for cyber hygiene. Don’t click on links or open attachments in email, and never assume that an email is from who you think it is from without proof. Did you get an email from a friend with an attachment that you weren’t expecting? Call or text them to check that they sent it. Get an email from your employer with a link in it? Hover over the link to confirm where it goes – or better yet, reach out to your IT team and make sure you are supposed to click on that link. Most companies have begun to send out pre-event emails such as “You will be receiving an invitation link to register for our upcoming event later today. The email will be from our event parter – myevents.com.” in order to make sure users know what is real and what is suspicious if not outright fake. 

The second defense is one you can’t control directly, but is happening all the time. Your email provider (your company, Google for GMail, Outlook.com for Microsoft, etc.) is constantly updating lists of known fake, fraudulent, and/or malicious email domains. Once a fake domain goes on the list, emails that come from there get blocked. While this is an effective defense, it can’t work alone as there will always be some time between when a threat actor starts using a new fake domain and when your email provider discovers and blocks it.

 

In short, that email from that legitimate looking email address may still be fake and looking to trick you. Hovering over the email sender name to see the full and real address and following good cyber hygiene can save you from opening or clicking something that is out to do you, your computer, and/or your company harm.

A common question I get from folks is some variant of “Should I be encrypting my laptop/desktop/phone?” While the idea of encrypting data might sound scary or difficult, the reality is the total opposite of both, so the answer is a resounding “YES!” That being said, many people have no idea how to actually do this, so let’s have a look at the most common Operating Systems (OSs) and how to get the job done.

First, let’s talk about what device and/or disk encryption actually does. Encryption renders the data on your device unusable unless someone has the decryption key – which these days is typically either a passcode/password or some kind of biometric ID like a fingerprint. So, while the device is locked or powered down, if it gets lost or stolen the data cannot be accessed by whoever now has possession of it. Most modern (less than 6 to 8 year old) devices can encrypt invisibly without any major performance impact, so there really isn’t a downside to enabling it beyond having to unlock your device to use it – which you should be doing anyway… hint, hint… 

Now, the downside – i.e. what encryption can’t do. First off, if you are on an older device, there may be a performance hit when you use encryption, or the options we talk about below may not be avialable. There’s a ton of math involved in encryption and decryption in real-time, and older devices might just not be up to the task at hand. This really only applies to extremely older devices, such as those from 6-8 years old, and at that point it may be time to start saving up to upgrade your device when you can afford to. Secondly, once the device is unlocked, the data is visible and accessible. What that means is that you still need to maintain good cyber and online hygiene when you’re using your devices. If you allow someone access, or launch malware, your data will be visible to that while you have it unlocked or while that malware is running. So encryption isn’t a magic wand to defend your devices, but it is a very powerful tool to help keep data secure if you lose the device or have it stolen. 

So, how do you enable encryption on your devices? Well, for many devices it’s already on believe it or not. Your company most likely forces the use of device encryption on your corporate phones and laptops, for example. But let’s have a look at the more common devices you might use in your personal life, and how to get them encrypted.

Windows desktops and laptops:

From Windows 10 onward (and on any hardware less than about 5 years old), Microsoft supports a technology called BitLocker to encrypt a device. BitLocker is a native tool in Windows 10 and 11 (and was available for some other versions of Windows) that will encrypt entire volumes – a.k.a. disk drives – including the system drive that Windows itself runs on. There are a couple of ways it can do this encryption, but for most desktops and laptops you want to use the default method of encryption using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) – basically a hardware chip in the machine that handles security controls with a unique identifier. How the TPM works isn’t really something you need to know, just know that there’s a chip on the board that is unique to your machine, and that allows technologies like BitLocker to encrypt your data uniquely to your machine. Turning on BitLocker is easy, just follow the instructions for your version of Windows 10 or 11 here: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838 – the basic idea being to go into settings, then security, then device encryption, but it’ll look slightly different depending on which version of Windows you’re using. One important note: If you’re using Windows 10 or 11 Home Edition, then you may have to follow specific instructions listed on the link on that web page to encrypt your drive instead of the whole system. It has the same overall outcome, but uses a slightly different method to get the job done. 

Mac desktops and laptops:

Here’s the good news, unless you didn’t choose the defaults during your first install/setup, you’re already encrypted. MacOS since about 4-5 versions ago automatically enables FileVault (Apple’s disk encryption system) when you set up your Mac unless you tell it not to do so. If you have an older MacOS version, or you turned it off during the setup, you can still turn it on now. Much like Microsoft, FileVault relies on a TPM to handle the details of the encryption, but all Macs that are still supported by Apple have a TPM, so unless you are on extremely old hardware (over 8-10 years old), you won’t have to worry about that. Also like Microsoft, Apple has a knowledge base article on how to turn it on manually if you need to do so: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/protect-data-on-your-mac-with-filevault-mh11785/mac

Android mobile devices (phones/tablets):

Android includes the ability to encrypt data on your devices as long as you are using a passcode to unlock the phone. You can turn encryption on even if you’re not using a passcode yet, but the setup will make you set a passcode as part of the process. While not every Android device supports encryption, the vast majority made in the last five years or so do, and it is fairly easy to set it up. You can find information on how to set this up for your specific version of Android from Google, such as this knowledge base article: https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/2844831?hl=en

Apple mobile devices (iPhone/iPad):

As long as you have a device that’s still supported by Apple themselves, your data is encrypted by default on iPhone and iPad as soon as you set up a passcode to unlock the phone. Since that’s definitely something you REALLY should be doing anyway then, if you are, then you don’t have to do anything else to make sure the data is encrypted. Note that any form of passcode will work, so if you set up TouchID or FaceID on your devices, that counts too; and your data is already encrypted. If you have not yet set up a passcode, TouchID, or FaceID, then there are instructions at this knowledge base article for how to do it: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/set-a-passcode-iph14a867ae/ios and similar articles exist for iPad and other Apple mobile devices. 

Some closing notes on device encryption: First and foremost, remember that when the device is unlocked, the data can be accessed. It’s therefore important to set a timeout for when the device will lock itself if not in use. This is usually on automatically, but if you turned that feature off on your laptop or phone, you should turn it back on. Secondly, a strong password/passcode/etc. is really necessary to defend the device. If a thief can guess the passcode easily, then they can unlock the device and get access to the data easily as well. Don’t use a simple 4-digit pin to protect the thing that holds all the most sensitive data about you. As with any other password stuff, I recommend the use of a passphrase to make it easy for you to remember, but hard for anyone else to guess. “This is my device password!” is an example of passphrase, just don’t use that one specifically – go make up your own. If your device supports biometric ID (like a fingerprint scanner), then that’s a great way to limit how many times you need to manually type in a complex password and can make your life easier.

Device encryption (and/or drive encryption) makes it so that if your device is lost or stolen, the data on that device is unusable to whoever finds/steals it. Setting up encryption on most devices is really easy, and the majority of devices won’t even suffer a performance hit to use it. In many cases, you’re already using it and don’t even realize it’s on, though it never hurts to check and be sure about that. So, should you use encryption on your personal devices? Yes, you absolutely should.

 

A recent Reddit thread had a great situation for us to talk about here. The short version is that a company notified all employees that web traffic would be monitored – including for secure sites – and recommended using mobile devices without using the company WiFi to do any non-business web browsing. This, as you might guess, caused a bit of an uproar with multiple posters calling it illegal (it’s usually not), a violation of privacy (it is), and because it’s Reddit, about 500 other things of various levels of veracity. Let’s talk about the technology in question and how it works.

For about 95% of the Internet these days, the data flowing between you and websites is encrypted via a technology known officially as Transport Layer Security (TLS), but almost universally referred to by the name of the technology TLS replaced some time ago, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). No matter what you call it, TLS is the tech that is currently used, and what’s responsible for the browser communicating over HTTPS:// instead of HTTP://. Several years ago, non-encrypted web traffic was deprecated – a.k.a. phased out – because Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Firefox, Opera, and just about every other browser began to pop up a message whenever a user went to a non-secure web page. As website owners (myself included) did not want to deal with large numbers of help requests, secured (HTTPS://) websites became the norm; and you’d be hard-pressed to find a non-encrypted site these days. 

So, if the data flowing between your browser and the website is encrypted, how can a company see it? Well, the answer is that they normally can’t, but organizations can set up technology that allows them to decrypt the data flowing between you and the site if you are browsing that site on a laptop, desktop, or mobile device that the organization manages and controls. To explain that, we’ll have to briefly talk about a method of threat activity known as a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack:

MitM attacks work by having a threat actor intercept your web traffic, and then relay it to the real website after they’ve seen it and possible altered it. As you might guess, this could be devastating for financial institutions, healthcare companies, or anyone else that handles sensitive data and information. Without SSL encryption, MitM attacks can’t really be stopped. You think you’re logging into a site, but in reality you’re talking to the threat actor’s web server, and THEY are talking to the real site – so they can see and modify data you send, receive, or both. SSL changes things. The way SSL/TLS works is with a series of security certificates that are used along with some pretty complex math to create encryption keys that both your browser and the website agree to use to encrypt data. That’s a massive oversimplification, but a valid high-level explanation of what’s going on. Your browser and the website do this automatically, and nearly instantly, so you don’t actually see any of it happening unless something goes wrong and you get an error message. If a threat actor tries to put themselves in the middle, then both your browser and the website will immediately see that the chain of security is broken by something/someone, and refuse to continue the data transfer. By moving to nearly universal use of SSL, Man in the Middle attacks have become far less common. It’s still technically possible to perform an MitM attack, but exceedingly more difficult than before, and certainly more difficult than a lot of other attack methods a threat actor could use.

Then how can your company perform what is effectively a MitM process on your web traffic without being blocked? Simple, they tell your computer that it’s OK for them to do it. The firewalls and other security controls your company uses could decrypt the SSL traffic before it reaches your browser. That part is fairly easy to do, but would result in a lot of users not being able to get to a whole lot of websites successfully. So, they use a loophole that is purposely carved out of the SSL/TLS standards. Each device (desktop/laptop/mobile/etc.) that the company manages is told that it should trust a specific security certificate as if it was part of the certificate chain that would normally be used for SSL. This allows the company to re-encrypt the data flow with that certificate, and have your browser recognize it as still secure. The practice isn’t breaking any of the rules, and in fact is part of how the whole technology stack is designed to work expressly for this kind of purpose, so your browser works as normal even though all the traffic is being viewed un-encrypted by the company. I want to be clear here – it’s not a person looking at all this traffic. Outside of extremely small companies that would be impossible. Automated systems decrypt the traffic, scan it for any malware or threat activity, then re-encrypt it with the company’s special certificate and ferry it on to your browser. A similar process happens in the other direction, but that outbound data is re-encrypted with the website’s certificate instead of the company’s certificate. Imagine that the systems are basically using their own browser to communicate with the websites, and ferrying things back and forth to your browser. That’s another over-simplification just to outline what is going on. Humans only get involved if the automated systems catch something that requires action. That being said, humans *can* review all that data if they wanted to or needed to as it is all logged – it’s just not practical to do that unless there’s an issue that needs to be investigated.

That brings us to another question. Why tell everyone it’s happening if it can be done invisibly for any device the company controls and manages? Well, remember way up above when we talked about if it was legal, or a violation of privacy, or a host of other things? Most companies will bypass the decryption for sites they know contain financial information, healthcare info, and other stuff that they really don’t want to examine at all. That being said, it’s not possible to ensure that every bank, every hospital and doctor’s and dentist’s office, every single site that might have sensitive data on it is on the list to bypass the filter. Because of that, many companies will make it known via corporate communications and in employee manuals that all traffic can be visible to the IT and cybersecurity teams. It’s a way to cover themselves if they accidentally decrypt sensitive information that could be a privacy violation or otherwise is something they shouldn’t, or just don’t want to, see. 

Companies are allowed to do this on their own networks, and on devices that they own, control, or otherwise manage. Laws vary by country and locality, and I am not a lawyer, but at least here in the USA they can do this whenever they want as long as employees consent to it happening. The Washington Post did a whole write-up on the subject here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/20/work-from-home-computer-monitoring/ (note, this may be paywalled for some site visitors). As long as the company gets that consent (say, for example, having you sign that you have read and agree to all of the stuff in that Employee Handbook), they can monitor traffic that flows across their own networks and devices. Some companies, of course, just want to give employees a heads-up that it’s happening, but most are covering their bases to make sure they’re following the rules for whatever country/locality they and you are in. 

What about using a VPN? That could work, if you can get it to run. Many VPN services would bypass the filtering of SSL Decryption, because they’re encrypting the traffic end-to-end with methods other than SSL/TLS. In short, the browser and every other app are now communicating in an encrypted channel that the firewall and other controls can’t decrypt. Not all VPN’s are created equal though, so it isn’t a sure thing. Also keep in mind that most employers who do SSL Decryption also know about VPN’s, and will work to block them from working on their networks.

One last note: Don’t confuse security and privacy. Even without SSL Decryption, your employer can absolutely see the web address and IP address of every site you visit. This is because of two factors. First, most Domain Name Servers (DNS) are not encrypted. That’s changing over time, but right now it is highly likely that your browser looks up where the website is via a non-encrypted system. Second, even if you’re using secure DNS (which exists, but isn’t in wide-spread use), the company’s network still has to connect to the website’s network – which means at the very least the company will know the IP addresses of the sites you visit. This isn’t difficult to reverse and figure out what website is on that IP address, so your company can still see where you went – even if they don’t know what you did while you were there.

To sum up: Can your employer monitor your web surfing even if you’re on a secure website? Yes – provided they have set up the required technology, own and/or manage the device you’re using, and (in most cases) have you agree to it in the employee manual or via other consent methods. Is that legal? Depends on where you live and where the company is located, but for a lot of us the answer is “yes.” Doesn’t it violate my privacy? Yes, though most companies will at least try to avoid looking at traffic to sites that are known to have sensitive data. Your social media feeds, non-company webmail, and a whole lot of other stuff are typically fair game though; so just assume that everywhere you surf, they can see what you’re doing. Can you get around that with a VPN? Maybe, but your company may effectively block VPN services. And finally, does this mean if my company isn’t doing SSL Decryption that I’m invisible? No, there’s still a record of what servers you visited, and most likely what URL’s you went to.

Last but not least: with very few exceptions, the process of SSL Decryption is done for legitimate and very real security reasons. The technology helps keep malware out of the company’s network and acts as another link in the chain of security defending the organization. While there are no doubt some companies that do this to spy on their employees, they are the exception rather than the rule. Check FaceBook and do your banking on your phone (off WiFi) or wait until you get home. 

I get a lot of great questions from people in all different areas of business, but one comes up more than most: “How does ransomware even work?” Granted, we know what the goal of ransomware is – to get paid to unlock files that are locked down by a threat actor – but how does it operate, function, do what it does? Let’s dive into this topic.

Ransomware is a generic term to refer to any cyber attack where data is encrypted in order to make it unusable to a person or organization until a payment to the threat actor is made. Because locking up the data by encrypting it renders most businesses partially or totally unable to conduct business, it is a devastatingly effective form of attack, and a preferred method of threat activity these days. How it does what it does, however, is a bit more complicated; as the methods and scope of ransomware have changed over the 20-plus years we’ve been dealing with it as a security community.

Modern ransomware can be broken down into two broad categories: Single-extortion ransomware that just locks the data down, and double-extortion ransomware that also steals a copy of all the impacted data before locking it down. Each has evolved to reduce the ability of an organization to recover from backup or otherwise fix things without having to pay the threat actor, but each category is equally popular among criminal groups. 

Single-extortion ransomware works by first gaining access to a desktop, laptop, or server. This can be through one of many initial access methods, but the more commonly used techniques these days are subterfuge and exploiting a vulnerability. See the previous post at https://www.miketalon.com/2024/02/cybersecurity-in-plain-english-how-do-threat-actors-get-in/ for more info on initial access. Subterfuge includes things like tricking a user into visiting a booby-trapped website, hiding malware in what appears to be a valid software application, or otherwise getting a user (or automated system) to install the threat actor’s software on a machine/virtual machine, etc. Exploitation of a vulnerability requires less (or no) interaction by a user, but rather tricks/forces an application or platform into doing something malicious by taking advantage of a weakness in the software or hardware itself. Note that threat actors are aware that anti-malware exists, and so will attempt to hide what they are doing for as long as possible and avoid triggering the anti-malware whenever possible (see dwell time below). This is referred to as “evasion,” and there are many different techniques that are used to different levels of effectiveness, depending on what anti-malware defenses are in place.  

Once they have the first device compromised, the threat actor then will typically attempt to spread their influence to as many other machines as possible (referred to as “propagation”). Since most organizational systems now use some form of Endpoint Detection and Response (an advanced type of anti-malware system), this has to be done carefully and cautiously to evade tripping detection and defensive systems. In fact, a threat actor can take weeks or even months just moving around a victim network in search of more devices and systems to take control of before they do anything like encrypting data. This is most commonly referred to as “dwell time,” with the average being about 10 days in 2023 but many sticking around for far longer to gain control of more systems. It isn’t uncommon to see dwell times stretching into months as double-extortion attacks become more common.

More commonly these days, threat actors will also attempt to disable backup solutions and try to weaken or disable anti-malware solutions as they go. This allows them to spread further, and to ensure that once they do spring the trap, the organization won’t have recent backups to restore from. Both actions make it more likely that the victim organization will pay to have their data unencrypted. Remember that ransomware is a business – a criminal business, but still a business – so the more likely a victim is to make a payment, the more money the criminal business generates. Additionally, many modern threat-actors will install back-door systems which will allow them to re-enter the organization’s systems if the organization does choose not to pay – so that the threat actor can re-encrypt over and over until they get money. 

Once the threat actor has gotten onto as many systems as possible and made sure things like backups have been rendered useless, then single-extortion ransomware enters its final stage. Some, most, or all of the data on each infected machine is encrypted using a key only known to the threat actor. Without going into too much detail here, threat actors use a theory known as asymmetrical encryption – meaning that the key that encrypts the data cannot be used to decrypt it. So even if the organization captures the encryption key, it won’t be useful in getting back to business. Once done, the threat actor either displays a message on the infected systems and/or directly contacts the organization to demand a ransom in exchange for the decryption key; and the attack is then finished.

For double-extortion ransomware, the game changes a bit. While all of the above steps still happen, there is another step added in between the propagation phase – where the threat actor tries to compromise as many systems as possible without being caught – and the encryption phase. As they move across the organization’s systems, the double-extortion ransomware threat actor begins stealing a copy of the data that they discover. There are many methods for performing this step, but the most common involve sending a copy of each file to cloud storage that the threat actor has access to. Many have asked why cloud providers don’t prohibit this activity and stop double-extortion ransomware, and the answer to that question will be in an upcoming article, but suffice it to say that currently; they really can’t police this type of data transfer in order to stop it. Data exfiltration can occur quickly, or very quietly – with different threat actors preferring different techniques in a trade-off between getting everything fast or evading defenses but taking longer to get the job done. 

This dataset is held until after the threat actor encrypts the original data on the organization’s systems, and the data theft can go on for as long as the threat actor is able to dwell within the organization. This means that not only can all current data be stolen, but any new data can also be siphoned off and stolen as the attack progresses. With dwell times adding up to potentially months, this can mean a great deal of current data can be stolen as it is created and modified by employees. 

Once the trap is sprung and the original data is encrypted, the threat actor now has two threats they can use to extort a payout from the victim organization. First, they will offer the decryption key in much the same way as with single-extortion ransomware. Secondly, they offer to destroy their copy of the data if the ransom is paid; but threaten to release that data to the general public if the ransom is not payed. So, even if an organization can recover without paying the ransom, they still must contend with the fact that highly privileged data could be released to the outside world unless they pay. For organizations like law firms, healthcare companies, payment processors, and other organizations that hold extremely privileged information, such public release of the info could be devastating and even trigger massive regulatory fines and penalties. Even a business that writes off the encrypted data as a loss may not be able to weather all of that data becoming public knowledge to anyone who wishes to view it. The hit to customer trust, regulatory fines, impact to stock prices, loss of investors, and other factors make such a release of data something many companies cannot withstand without going out of business. 

Some ransomware threat actors have even taken things a step further with so-called triple-extortion attacks. The data itself is encrypted, the stolen data is threatened to be released to the general public, and the threat actor also threatens persons and companies that appear in the data to try to get them to pay in addition to the company the data came from. For example, if a ransomware actor compromises a hospital, the data on the hospital data-systems is encrypted, a the threat actor threatens to release the copy of that data which they hold to the general public, and the threat actor reaches out to individual patients and demands that they also pay money to keep their own data that was in the stolen data-set from becoming public. This maximizes the payout the threat actor can get, and makes it even more likely that the original victim organization (the hospital in this scenario) will pay them to make the whole problem go away. 

Many have asked me if they should pay the ransom. While I can’t speak to every situation that ransomware can create, my overall recommendation is not to pay if there is any other way to get back to business. Paying the ransom has several negative effects: First, you’re giving money to one or more people who admit they are criminals. There’s no guarantee that they’ll do what they say they’ll do if you pay them, and they may have back-door access to continue harming your organization even if they do give you the decryption keys. There’s also no way to validate that they deleted their stolen copy of the data, and in fact law enforcement was able to find supposedly deleted data on threat actor systems they took control of in raids and shutdowns [https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/03/blackcat-ransomware-group-implodes-after-apparent-22m-ransom-payment-by-change-healthcare/]. Second, every time the threat actor is paid, it encourages more threat actors to get into the ransomware business to make money. Third, depending on who the threat actor is and where you are, it might be against the law to send money to the threat actor at all and therefore expose your organization to even more regulatory and/or legal issues. Some information on this for US companies can be found here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf . While there are some cases where paying the threat actor is the only way to resolve the situation, every organization should think long and hard about the repercussions to their own business and to the greater business world if they do so. 

Ransomware is an insidious threat that is growing every day. With double- and triple-extortion techniques growing in popularity, even the ability to recover without paying the ransom doesn’t remove the threat that the criminals can hold over an organization and its customers. That being said, it is not all doom and gloom. By keeping software updated, not interacting with links in emails or attachments that come in with them, and practicing basic online hygiene; users can thwart a large number of ransomware attacks. Exploitation of weaknesses in software will still be a problem, and organization must address these by utilizing additional security controls to compensate for the weakness, but effective strategies do exist for minimizing the potential to be struck by ransomware. Together, we can make it less lucrative for a threat actor to use ransomware, causing their business models to break and making the net a safer place. 

A reader recently asked, “What is IAM and why is it important?” This is a bit of a complex question, but we can definitely dive into some of the higher-level concepts and details to de-mystify Identity and Access Management (IAM).

IAM is simply the series of technologies that control who is allowed to access what on your corporate systems. The complexity comes about because – while the idea is simple – the actual implementation of IAM is one of the most complex operations that many companies will ever undertake. The reason is straight-forward, humans are not generally logical and orderly beings. Because of that, systems which enable humans to do their jobs also tend to be complicated and intertwined, meaning making sure only the right people have access to the right systems and data is often difficult at best. So, let’s have a look at the basic ideas behind IAM and what they do.

First, the Principle of Least Access is the starting ground for any IAM solution set. As its name would imply, this principle says that each user should be first given the absolute minimum amount of access to systems and applications, regardless of any other factor. When a user needs access to something more, they get it quickly and efficiently, but they only get the bare minimum access to that “something more” and no more than that. As an example, a new user needs access to things like file servers, email, and some applications. This access would be very specifically defined, giving them access to just the folders on the file server they require; for example. They get an email box, but don’t get access to shared mailboxes automatically. They get read-only access to applications, not full access. Then, based on the needs of the user and the approvals of management, the user can request and gain additional access as and when required. While this process can be cumbersome – especially when a user is first starting with an organization – it also avoids over-provisioning access that later must be pulled back. Provisioning and de-provisioning solutions can greatly aid with this process, allowing IT teams to quickly add and remove access as needed with a minimum of manual steps. Note that de-provisioning is as critical as provisioning. When an employee changes roles or leaves the organization, or when an application is reconfigured or replaced, access must also be updated to maintain the principle in action; ensuring users have the access they need but no more. 

Second, one source of truth per organization. While it is very possible for every application and site to have their own identity data store, that is a recipe for disaster as a company grows and evolves. Instead, a single source of truth for identity – like Microsoft’s Active Directory or a similar solution – allows for much tighter and effective control over identity and access. Each application would then use that single source to confirm the identity of the person logging in and what they’re allowed to have access to. The most common form of this idea in organizations today is Single Sign-On (SSO) – where you go to log in to an application (like SalesForce) and see your browser re-direct to your company login page. SalesForce is checking with your company’s single source of identity truth, instead of keeping its own database of users within the app. This is a bit of an oversimplification, as the methods and technologies used to do SSO are complex, but the basic theory of using one source of truth to identify users is the goal.

Third, the concept of zero trust. Zero trust has become a bit of a buzzword in the cybersecurity industry of late, but the actual operational methodology is extremely valuable. Zero trust says that whenever a user, systems, application, etc. attempts to access anything; they/it must prove that they are who they are and must have been granted access for that specific operation. This means that even if the user had been logged into an application already, their identity would still be challenged if they attempted to access other areas of the application. A system talking to another system might have to pass an authentication challenge if it tried to access data in another database. This is significantly different than traditional access methods which say that a user who can use an application has all of their access rights “pre-cached” and ready to go. The reason for zero trust is that a user’s device (or a data system itself) could be used in a way that is not appropriate – either because the user is attempting to do something they shouldn’t on purpose or by accident, or because the device has been compromised by a threat actor. This could easily result in access to data and systems that shouldn’t be accessible, or where access has been removed, but that removal hasn’t yet filtered down to the application in question. In short, zero trust gets its name from the fact that a user – even a user who already logged into something – isn’t trusted as they move around applications and systems. They must pass identity checks (which often happen invisibly to the actual user) to gain access to additional resources. 

Identity and Access Management attempts to implement all these theories and more, and so can be a complicated strategy for any organization to undertake. By giving users access to only what they require, forcing all applications and systems to use a single source of identity truth, and ensuring that access requests are dynamic and not static; organizations can begin to tame the beast that is IAM without keeping users and systems from effectively doing their jobs. 

A reader recently asked, “What is a firewall? How does it work, and what is it doing?” Both good questions, so let’s dig in and uncover what this critical network defense system does.

Most of us that have owned a car know that in an automobile, the firewall is the heavy metal panel that sits between the passenger compartment and the engine. Since the engine (in gas-powered and hybrid vehicles) works by exploding petroleum products, the chance that something could cause a fire is not insignificant. Especially in a crash or after taking damage from other sources, engine fires could pose a huge threat to anyone in the car itself. Therefore, the physical firewall does exactly what it says on the tin – it serves as a barrier between a fire in the engine compartment and everyone sitting in the passenger compartment. Physical firewalls are not uncommon in many other areas, such as in boats, different types of home/office areas, etc.

Digital firewalls are one of those things in cybersecurity that sound incredibly confusing, but the basic functions are actually straightforward. While there are advanced firewall platforms which do a ton of additional things, the primary function of a firewall is to control what comes into and goes out of a network. In essence, it serves the same function as the physical firewall – it keeps something burning through the Internet from getting in to your controlled networks at home or in the office. It does this by looking at the traffic that is being moved into and out of the network itself, trying to find systems and patterns that just don’t belong there and blocking them from entering. The firewall also acts as a boundary to keep internal traffic from going out across the Internet as well, so that network information doesn’t leak. Note that we’re not talking about keeping confidential data from getting stolen here – the firewall deals with network traffic and cannot, alone, stop someone from sending a file outside the org if they’re sending it to a non-malicious target like Dropbox or OneDrive. 

 

One bit of clarification before we move on: Commercial firewalls are designed to be used in corporate networks and are capable of seeing and filtering massive amounts of information – up to several gigabytes of data per second or more. They also can optionally have many of the advanced features that the rest of this post will describe. Home firewalls are significantly more limited, both in the speed of data they can process and in the features that are available. Your home firewall (most likely built into the router/modem you got from your cable provider or phone company) can cover the basics described below, but most likely can’t process more than one gigabyte of data per second or handle IDS/IPS and other advanced feature-sets. 

 

Most of this blocking activity is based on allow and block lists that are updated regularly within the firewall itself. Most commercial (and some home) firewalls come with subscriptions to threat intelligence feeds that provide them with constantly-updated lists of known malicious websites, IP addresses, and known malware file signatures to help make sure that any inbound our outbound traffic isn’t coming from/going to somewhere that is known to be a threat to the org. Most commercial and home firewalls can block traffic that doesn’t conform to known-safe patterns as well, such as when an application attempts to reach out over a weird port and/or some external website or app tries to communicate to your computer without your computer first communicating with that site or app. 

Threat actors haven’t ignored how firewalls act, though, and have begun to take steps to overcome the protection a basic firewall can provide. For example, since most websites now use the more secure “HHTPS” protocol instead of the plainly visible HTTP, threat actors have started to also use HTTPS communication for their malicious actions. As HTTPS transmissions are encrypted, it’s very difficult – if not impossible – for a basic firewall to see if the communication is moving malicious files or performing other forms of bad behavior. While it is still possible to block connections by port or by originating site/URL, the firewall can no longer see the traffic itself, and therefore loses some important functionality. So, how do firewalls evolve to help with this?

Modern firewalls have many additional features, though generally they’re only available on more expensive commercial firewalls or very high-end home firewalls costing about as much as a commercial firewall. These include things like SSL decryption and inspection and Intrusion Detection Systems/Services (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems/Services (IPS). These tool-sets make it significantly more difficult for a threat actor to succeed in getting across the firewall, but also add layers of complexity to cybersecurity that require trained and knowledgeable staff to set up and maintain.

SSL decryption and inspection is exactly what it says on the packet. HTTPS communications are encrypted between the website and the browser/application, and therefore appear as meaningless garbage when viewed by a normal firewall. With SSL decryption, these streams of data are decrypted by the firewall, examined for malicious content or intent, then re-encrypted and passed to the user’s device that requested them. Outbound data is also examined in this way, to look for signs that a user’s device is compromised, or potentially than an insider threat action is happening. Because of the nature of HTTPS, you can’t just decrypt and then re-encrypt data. That would result in major errors in the applications and browsers communicating over HTTPS and create a lot of headaches for users and app creators as well – as apps and browsers automatically look for and block this kind of activity thinking it is a threat action. So, to set up SSL decryption and inspection, the IT/Cybersecurity team must configure both the network itself and also every device that will communicate over it with policies and security certificates which tell the devices that if traffic is re-encrypted by that known firewall, it should be treated as if it was never decrypted in the first place. This is, of course, very specific to the network in question, and only works if the end user device can confirm that the specific firewall in question was the only device to decrypt and then re-encrypt the data. By implementing SSL decryption and inspection, malware and other malicious traffic can be properly examined before it reaches the end-user device, allowing the firewall to resume its duties even where sites and apps are now sending/receiving data over HTTPS. As you might guess, this system requires not only knowledgable IT/Cybersecurity staff; but also help from Legal, Regulatory, Compliance, and often HR teams to make sure that no privacy or data regulations are being violated – as the organization can now see what would otherwise be unreadable data transmissions to banks, medical providers, and other sensitive/confidential communications.  

IDS/IPS are systems which look at data packets are being moved into and out of the network like a basic firewall, but they also seek out known patterns and behaviors that are malicious. This is accomplished by keeping track of what is being sent and received, and comparing that information to updated lists of data flows and behaviors which would indicate suspicious or outright malicious behaviors. A common example is a compromised endpoint getting data that is identifiable as Command and Control (C2) information from a threat tool or platform like a ransomware operator or criminal threat group. This would indicate that the end-user device is likely being subverted for use by a threat actor. As with blocking known bad websites and URL’s, this requires continuously updated data on what activity and network traffic is considered to be such an indicator of compromise, and IDS/IPS service providers will also provide threat feeds that supply this information to the firewall on an ongoing basis. IDS/IPS can be used in conjunction with SSL decryption and inspection to perform even more effective scanning activities, and it isn’t uncommon for both functions to be part of a next-generation firewall platform, while still allowing the IT team to decide if they will use one, the other, or both. The names (Intrusion Detection vs. Intrusion Prevention) refer to two forms of this kind of protective feature. IDS will alert staff if indicators of compromise are detected, but will not actively block traffic. While IPS will both alert and block traffic when it sees suspicious activity. A firewall may offer one or the other, but rarely both because IPS includes IDS detection features as part of its basic operations. Blocking benign traffic can create massive disruptions to business, so IT/Cybersecurity teams must properly configure and regularly tune these systems to make sure the bad stuff gets blocked, good stuff gets through, and anything else is reported and quickly evaluated to determine what to do next. 

Finally, firewalls can be extended to work with other cybersecurity tools and platforms. Endpoint protection solutions can work cooperatively with firewalls to help detect and deal with malware or other activities that involve more than one stream of data and/or multiple endpoints. Data Loss Prevention tools can integrate with a firewall to block the transmission of data outside of extremely restricted endpoints and business applications. The potential list of integrations is nearly limitless, and your IT/Cybersecurity team can set up the right combination of tools, with the right configurations, to best protect the business while still letting users get their work done. 

So, a firewall is a device (usually physical but sometimes virtual) that sits between your internal network and the outside world. Its job is to make sure any communications coming into the network conform to known traffic patterns and aren’t coming from known malicious sites/URLs. Firewalls can be extended to do additional cybersecurity tasks such as decrypting and examining HTTPS communications, and to detect and block known forms of malicious traffic even if they’re coming from otherwise benign sites and services. They can also be extended by integrating firewalls with other cybersecurity systems to enhance all of your cyber resilience plans. This is a bit of an oversimplification of the full depth and breadth of what modern firewalls can do, but it is a good way to visualize their operations and functionality in your networks. 

A reader recently asked if just running Operating Systems (OC) updates and anti-virus updates was enough to keep their home devices safe. While that’s a good start, it may not be enough to really stay safe out there, so let’s dive a little deeper into this topic:

OS updating is critical to making sure your home/personal devices stay safe. This also applies to work devices, but your organization may have tools that make that happen automatically, so check with your IT team to find out if you also need to do this on those laptops/desktops/etc. Anti-virus/anti-malware tools also need regular updating, but nearly all of them do that by themselves. The few that require you to manually update them are generally the free AV tools, but they’re also pretty simple to keep up-to-date. Open the app, go to the settings page, and check for updates. By making sure to keep these two things (the OS and your anti-malware tool) updated, you help to ensure that the majority of threat activity which isn’t coming in via social engineering techniques like phishing will get blocked. Don’t forget to do this for your phones, tablets, smart TVs, and other devices around your home. If it has an OS and connects to the Internet, you’ve got to make sure the device is checking for updates, or that you’re doing it yourself. 

Generally, you should be updating once per week. That’s a good trade-off between time spent doing updates and security for your devices. Set aside 30 minutes once per week to run through the process, and you’ll keep everything running smoothly. At the absolute least, you should be updating once per month, but a weekly cadence is a better choice as different vendors release updates on different schedules. 

That being said, your OS is not the only software running on your home systems. Windows, MacOS, and Linux devices – along with phones, TVs, and other smart devices – all run applications, and those applications can also get out of date. As these apps age, security researchers and threat actors alike find vulnerabilities in the software that can be used to make the app misbehave, gain access to things outside of the app itself, or cause damage to your data and/or steal it. Because of this, you’ll need to make sure you’re updating those apps regularly, but it doesn’t have to be a big time-sink. If an app is no longer supported by its vendor, then it is definitely time to start seeking out an alternative that is actively being updated. Legacy applications (apps that are no longer in active development) are a massive problem in the cybersecurity world, and while updating to a new app or a new version of the old app isn’t easy, it is absolutely necessary. Get that process started as soon as possible to give yourself time to make the change before a security vulnerability is discovered in that legacy application that forces you to migrate with no warning. 

Let’s look at how to do these kinds of updates on the major operating systems and for lots of applications:

 

To update your OS…

 

On Windows 7 and higher:

Go to Settings from the Start menu, then look for Windows Update. Check for Updates, then install anything it finds. You may need to reboot, and if so be sure to check Windows Update again after your reboot to make sure there aren’t any further updates to apply.  

On MacOS 12 and higher:

Go to the Apple Menu in the upper-left of the screen and choose System Settings. Then go to General, then Software Update. Let the system check for updates, and if it finds any go ahead and install them. In nearly every case this will require a reboot, but it needs to happen so give your Mac the time it needs.

On Linux:

Open a Terminal window and use your preferred package manager (like APT or yum) to look for updates. If any are found, install them. The good news is that, while you do this via the terminal, package managers also update any other software that was installed via the package manager in question, so you update nearly everything all at once. Reboots are rarely required, but if one is needed then you should let it go ahead and restart.

 

For applications, things are a bit different for Windows versus MacOS and Linux. Let’s step through the three major OS types and how you can keep up to date.

Windows: The elephant in the room. By default, you can get Microsoft application updates for apps like Office via Windows update (you may have to tell Windows Update to do that in its own settings page), but any other apps are not included in that check. This means you have to either use an app updater or go app-by-app to check for updates manually. You can typically find the update check in the Settings or Help sections of the application. There are some app managers like PatchMyPC ( https://patchmypc.com/home-updater ) that can help with many apps, and they’re worth checking out. Keep in mind that you should not use a patch manager unless you have reviews from trusted sources that they’re legitimate and safe. It’s unfortunate, but there are several “app manager” tools for Windows that are actually malware/spyware themselves. Microsoft themselves has tried to help here, with the Microsoft Store app allowing you to keep any apps you buy through that tool updated, but only a small portion of the available Windows apps are currently in the Store just yet. 

MacOS: Apps from the App Store can be updated by just going to the Store, then clicking Updates on the left-hand menu. For other apps, you’ll need to either check the apps manually (usually it’s in the applications main menu or the Help menu) or use an app manager for any apps you have that didn’t come from the App Store. MacUpdater (note the spelling, with an “r” at the end) is a great app manager for MacOS, and is reasonably priced ( https://www.corecode.io/macupdater/ ). It tracks tons of apps, and let’s you update with a simple click when it finds one that’s outdated. I’m not being compensated by them, I just use the tool myself and know it works really well. The Standard version will get the job done for most, but there are lots of options to choose from. Between the App Store covering a huge number of apps, and tools like MacUpdater taking care of the rest, you will be covered.

Linux: As mentioned in the OS section, package managers for Linux also update any applications installed from packages – which is the vast majority of apps you’d run on Linux. There are exceptions here and there, and you’ll need to manually check those periodically to stay up to date. 

Don’t forget to also have your phone, smartTV, smart home devices, and other things connected to the Internet also check for updates. This includes both OS and app updates! For example, you can ask Alexa to “Check for software updates,” and it will look for any new software it needs. iPhones and iPads can be updated by going to Settings: General: Software Update for the OS, and the Updates page of the App Store for apps. Android is a bit different, but Google has instructions for OS updates here: https://support.google.com/android/answer/7680439?hl=en and the Play store can help keep your apps up to date. 

Keeping both your Operating Systems and applications updated is critical to staying safe. Even with a great anti-malware system, outdated applications can let threat actors perform attacks that can succeed. Taking half an hour once per week to keep things up to date is an easy – and effective – way to make sure you’re not giving an attacker any low-hanging fruit to take advantage of. 

Earlier today, a reader asked “What happened with LockBit today? They’re all over the news.” Probably a question that a lot of people have, so let’s dive in and spell it out!

First things first, who or what is LockBit? Starting life as a ransomware gang some time ago, LockBit has been responsible for attacking the infrastructure and data systems of everything from small sole-proprietorships to multinational organizations. Tactics varied, but their primary operations revolved around double-extortion ransomware: where a copy of victim data is first removed from the environment and sent to LockBit servers in the cloud, then the original data is encrypted and rendered unusable to the victim organization. This allowed LockBit to demand payment for decryption of the data, but also to threaten to make all the stolen data public if the victim org decided they didn’t want to pay for the decryption itself. In this way, LockBit had multiple avenues of extortion to bring to bear in order to get paid by the victim. More recently, LockBit branched out into Ransomware as a Service, where they would create tool-kits and host infrastructure for other criminals to use when performing ransomware attacks against victims, with LockBit getting a cut of the criminally-acquired funds.

Now on to what happened: Early in the morning of Feb 20 here in the US, a coalition of law enforcement groups led by the National Crime Agency (NCA) in the United Kingdom and the FBI in the USA struck hard at the LockBit web infrastructure. In addition to many other operations – including multiple arrests of high-ranking LockBit members in multiple countries – law enforcement took down the dark-web back-end systems and the website that drove the Ransomware as a Service platform, effectively rendering the system useless for hundreds of affiliates of LockBit. The website itself was replaced with new information: First was a fairly standard notification that law enforcement agencies had seized the website and affiliated domains. As this site is where LockBit and their affiliates posted victim information if they didn’t pay up, this was a massive blow to the organization as a whole. Shortly after, however, this placeholder notification was itself replaced with a website that looked very similar to the original LockBit leaks site, but now showing information about the group itself, its members, its operations, and links for victims to get help and assistance from law enforcement. In short, the site returned to doing what it did prior to the seizure, but now hosting the information on LockBit; instead of on their victims. 

The operation – code-named “Cronos” – was carried out quickly and efficiently; with the entire process taking just a couple of hours from start to finish. The coordinated takedown of both the web infrastructure and arrest of LockBit leaders in multiple countries crippled the ransomware gang and their affiliates effectively – and even humorously – as LockBit’s own infrastructure was suddenly converted into a weapon against them and their affiliate network. 

It should be noted that this crippling of the gang could be temporary. Not all suspected LockBit leaders were arrested, and dark-web infrastructure has a very nasty habit of being resurrected quickly somewhere else. That being said, for now, I think we can call this a total win for law enforcement and a complete loss for LockBit and their Ransomware as a Service affiliate groups. 

One only wonders, will LockBit now be offering one year of complimentary identity protection services for their affiliates like many of organizations they attacked had to do for their customers after suffering a LockBit-affiliated attack?